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Eugenic ideas, laws, and policies were often cast explicitly in terms of a
person’s having certain kinds of socially undesirable properties, such
as feeble-mindedness, mental deficiency, or psychosis. For example, in
the second amendment to the Sexual Sterilization Act of Alberta
(1942), persons with neurosyphillis, epilepsy, and Huntington’s
disease came to be included amongst those subject to eugenic
sterilization in the province. However, in practice eugenics has
operated in both popular culture and in science in terms of the
corresponding sorts or kinds of people: the feebleminded, the mentally
deficient, and psychotics. One may wonder about the significance of
this perhaps innocent-looking shift from talk of people with certain
properties to sorts of people, especially in reflecting on the resurgence
of eugenic thinking in contemporary contexts. What role does
distinguishing between various sorts of people, and attaching a
differential value to those sorts of people, play in both the history of
eugenics and its contemporary aftermath?
Human Variation and Sorts of People
Thinking of there being distinctive sorts of people is one response to
the perception of human variation. This response, however, was not
new with eugenics in the nineteenth-century. In fact, thinking about
members of our species in terms of various sorts or kinds can be found
in ancient civilizations and is often bound up with the very idea of
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what it is to be human. Many societies, including those of ancient
China and ancient Greece, refer to themselves with terms that are
associated with full humanity, whereas they refer to people from alien
cultures and distant lands with terms that lack that association. For
example, “barbarians” for the ancient Greeks were people who did not
speak fully human language, merely “ba-ba”ing instead. Thus, the idea
of there being different sorts of people across time and space, not all of
whom are valued equally, is many thousands of years old (Lloyd,
2012).
We can approach the eugenic development of this appeal to sorts or
kinds of people by reflecting a little further on the nature of human
variation. Human beings vary in an unlimited number of ways. People
have different heights and weights, different hair and eye colour, and
different physical and mental abilities. Some variation, such as that
with respect to height and weight, is continuous: the varying
characteristic or property exists on a continuum. Other variation, such
as that with respect to hair and eye colour, is discrete, or at least is
usually thought of as such: there are a relatively small number of
categories used to classify the variation here, such as blonde, brown,
black , or red (for hair colour), or blue, brown, or green (for eye
colour). Both continuous and discrete variation can be the basis for
distinguishing between sorts of people, such as when we distinguish
tall from short people, or, moving to categories that wear their
evaluative dimension more clearly on their sleeve, when we distinguish
fat from skinny people.
Some of this variation matters more to us than does other variation.
For example, variation with respect to skin colour, language spoken,
and cultural practices and affiliations have been highly salient in
human history. They have been the basis not simply for distinguishing
between sorts of people on the basis of race and culture, but for the
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differential and often discriminatory treatment of the resulting
different sorts of people.
Eugenic Policies and Laws and Sorts of People
Race and ethnicity themselves have played a direct role in the history
of eugenics, with some “races” deemed to be inferior in various ways to
others. Thus such lesser sorts of people were subject to restrictive
immigration and eliminative sterilization policies that formed part of
the late nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century eugenics movement.
Eugenic sterilization laws themselves were most often expressed,
however, in terms of categories centered on the mental abilities that
people possessed, including those of feeblemindedness and mental
deficiency.
Eugenic policies and laws here straddled everyday, “folk” categories
and categories for classifying sorts of people that were the result of
scientific practice. For example, “idiots”, “imbeciles” and “morons”
were sorts of people who were characterized in terms of their level of
putative mental deficiency, where that level corresponded to the IQ
score those people gained on one or more standardized psychological
tests. The kind of thinking that drove eugenic family studies, such as
those of “The Jukes” and “The Nams”, also utilized folk categories of
people, such as paupers, criminals, and the sexually promiscuous, to
pick out sorts of people whose continuing family lineage was viewed as
contributing significantly to ongoing social problems resolvable by
eugenic intervention (Rafter, 1988).
Like Begets Like, Heredity, and Eugenics Today
An important thread to eugenic thinking about sorts of people is the
idea that “like begets like”: that the children of people of a certain sort
will also be of that sort. While this was understood in hereditarian
terms as eugenics appealed to the emerging biological sciences (e.g., of
genetics) from the early part of the twentieth-century, the role of
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hereditarian thinking in eugenics is complicated. Nineteenth-century
eugenics operated without significant biological knowledge of heredity.
Furthermore, those who acknowledge a significant role for
environmental circumstances in contributing to the production of a
given trait or characteristic can still present the eugenic shaping of
future populations as something desirable. Indeed, that is precisely
what one finds in the contemporary bioethics literature advocating
“liberal eugenics” (Agar, 2004; Kitcher, 2003) and various principles
governing parenting that are viewed as seeking to minimize disability
(Savulescu, 2001; Savulescu & Kahane, 2008).
Are there Sorts of People?
The broader metaphysical issue of whether any sorts of people “are
real” might usefully be located as part of the general issue of the reality
of kinds. Proponents of realism about kinds hold that the world is
naturally divided into distinct kinds of things, and our task is (to use a
metaphor inspired by Plato) to “carve nature at its joints”. For
example, oxygen and nitrogen are real kinds of chemical elements,
each with distinctive clusters of properties and behaviours, and the
task of chemistry, in part, is to accurately characterize those properties
and behaviours. Proponents of nominalism, by contrast, hold that
reality is differentiated only with the gentle (or not so gentle) touch of
the human mind; social constructivism is a variant of this view that
emphasizes the role of human institutions and practices in this
process.
One might reasonably hold that realist views of sorts of people have
been discredited by the history of eugenics. After all, the sorts of
people articulated within the eugenics movement are no longer taken
to be part of the fabric of the world, and a basis for social policy and
legislation. Yet appeals to sorts of people—to the severely cognitively
disabled, to schizophrenics, to children with Down Syndrome—where
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the people referred to are many of the same sorts of individuals who
were the target of eugenic practices and policies, continue to animate
contemporary discussions of persons, parents with disabilities, and
reproductive rights in ways that are often continuous with the eugenic
past.
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